The improper season of the year in which we attempted to double Cape Horn, and to which is to be imputed the disappointment (recited in the foregoing chapter) of falling in with Terra del Fuego, when we reckoned ourselves above a hundred leagues to the westward of that whole coast, and consequently well advanced into the Pacifick Ocean; this unseasonable navigation, I say, to which we were necessitated by our too late departure from England, was the fatal source of all the misfortunes we afterwards encountered. For from hence proceeded the separation of our ships, the destruction of our people, the ruin of our project on Baldivia, and of all our other views on the Spanish places, and the reduction of our squadron from the formidable condition in which it passed Streights Le Maire to a couple of shattered half-manned cruisers and a sloop, so far disabled that in many climates they scarcely durst have put to sea. To prevent, therefore, as much as in me lies, all ships hereafter bound to the South Seas from suffering the same calamities, I think it my duty to insert in this place such directions and observations as either my own experience and reflection, or the conversation of the most skilful navigators on board the squadron, could furnish me with, in relation to the most eligible manner of doubling Cape Horn, whether in regard to the season of the year, the course proper to be steered, or the places of refreshment both on the east and west side of South America. And first, with regard to the proper place for refreshment on the east side of South America. For this purpose the island of St. Catherine's has been usually recommended by former writers, and on their faith we put in there, as has been formerly mentioned. But the treatment we met with, and the small store of refreshments we could procure there, are sufficient reasons to render all ships for the future cautious {86} how they trust themselves in the government of Don Jose Sylva de Paz, for they may certainly depend on having their strength, condition, and designs betrayed to the Spaniards, as far as the knowledge the governor can procure of these particulars will give him leave. And as this treacherous conduct is inspired by the views of private gain in the illicit commerce carried on to the river of Plate, rather than by any national affection which the Portuguese bear the Spaniards, the same perfidy may perhaps be expected from most of the governors of the Brazil coast, since these smuggling engagements are doubtless very extensive and general. And though the governors should themselves detest so faithless a procedure, yet as ships are perpetually passing from some or other of the Brazil ports to the river of Plate, the Spaniards could scarcely fail of receiving, by this means, casual intelligence of any British ships upon the coast, which, however imperfect such intelligence might be, would prove of dangerous import