A Woman's Philosophy of Woman; or, Woman affranchised.: An answer to Michelet, Proudhon, Girardin, Legouvé, Comte, and other modern innovatorsHéricourt, Madame d'
Philosophy
A Woman's Philosophy of Woman; or, Woman affranchised.: An answer to Michelet, Proudhon, Girardin, Legouvé, Comte, and other modern innovators
Héricourt, Madame d'
Women's rights -- France
Since woman now is generally mother and housewife while performing at the
same time a host of other functions, she will become none the less so in
taking upon herself a few more; besides, the time of life at which an
individual enters certain important functions is that at which woman has
finished her maternal task. A few women acting as public functionaries
will not hinder the great majority of their companions from remaining in
private life, any more than a few men in the same position hinder the
mass of men from continuing there.
VI.
You admit a classification at last, you say, and still more you grant
that there are masculine and feminine functions. You are mistaken,
gentlemen: you accused me of being incapable of giving you a complete
theory, I have given you the outlines of four--outlines which it would be
easy for me to extend and perfect. But I do not admit a single one of
these theories as a whole.
Are you eclectic, then?
The gods forbid! I have as much repugnance to eclecticism, as to _mystic
trinitarianism_ and _androgyny_.
I do not admit the theory of the identity of the sexes, because I believe
with Biology that an essential organic difference modifies the entire
being; that therefore woman must differ from man.
I do not admit the theory of the superiority of either sex, because it is
absurd; humanity is man-woman or woman-man; we do not know what one sex
would be if it were not incessantly modified by its relations with the
other, and we know them only as thus modified: What we know to a
certainty is that they form together the existing condition of humanity;
that they are equally necessary and equally useful to each other and to
society.
I do not admit my third theory because it is ultra-nominalism nominalism;
if it is really true that all the individuals of both sexes differ among
themselves in a far more remarkable manner than those of the other
species, it is none the less true that a classification, founded upon a
constant anatomical characteristic, is legitimate, and that the principle
of classification lies in the nature of things, for if things appear to
us classified, it is because they are so; the laws of the mind are the
same as those of Nature so far as knowledge is concerned; we must admit
this, unless we are sceptics or idealists, and I am neither the one nor
the other; neither am I a realist in the philosophic acceptation of the
word, for I do not believe that the species is something apart from the
individuals in which it is manifested; it is in them and through them;
this repeats the affirmation that there are individuals identical in one
or several respects, although different in all others.
Lastly, I do not admit the fourth theory, although it may be true in
principle, because the numerous facts that contradict the distinguishing
characteristics, do not permit me to believe that these characteristics
are laws established by sexuality.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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