But since it has been convenient for the world, for general society, that it should _vest_ in certain persons, in the same manner as any other property vests in certain other persons, either here or there, in this country or any other, and that no persons should have any other title in any other property than that which is held by this conventional rule for general good, it would be a manifest and flagrant injustice, robbery, for one part of general society to demand of another part, to resign this title without indemnification, while the party making this demand claims to hold its own. Of course, this question does not touch the right of the slave to himself, or in any way affect that claim. It may be seen, then, how this matter stands in the United States. We strike at the very foundations of society, when we use our influence to impair the rights of property, as established by general consent; and the impulse of the blow, in the circle of its action, must necessarily return to ourselves, in its natural, or rather artificial, channel, as society in all its parts is an artificial edifice. We can no more move upon the South for such an object, than they can move upon us; in laying our hand upon their property to impair its title, we impair our own in the same degree. For our convenience and profit, be it known, the title to slave property has happened to vest in them; and for their convenience and profit the title to our property has happened to vest in us, because we happen to be here and not there, and they there and not here. Both titles are equally sacred in the relations we bear to each other.