Unless, therefore, the Abolitionists have made up their minds to go into this field in the character of pirates and brigands, we see not how they can move an inch, till they are prepared to make the tender of indemnification for the release of the property which they claim. We aver solemnly, that it is with pain we have written the last sentence, and that if any other terms would have represented the exact truth of the case, as it stands before our mind, we should have preferred them. We agree with the Abolitionists as to the _wrong_ of slavery, though we dissent from them, both as to the expediency and duty of _immediate_ emancipation, in view of all the facts and circumstances of the case; and we dissent from them utterly, _ab imo pectore_, as to the _validity_ of slave property, not in relation to the slave, however, but in relation to general society; and we are prepared to go with the nation for redemption by a fair indemnification. Though we may have little at stake in such a concern, yet he who has little may feel the burden more than he that has much. We are prepared, however, to point out a way, the burden of which no man will feel, and one that is practicable, too. To enforce abolition without indemnification, would be as bad for the slave, as for the master, because it would be the ruin of both; it would blot from future history all those political Commonwealths, because they would be absolutely too poor to maintain themselves. The most formidable difficulty of Abolitionism, therefore, and the most disorganizing principle, of all, plants itself on the very threshold of the enterprise: _non-indemnification_. Their only reason, so far as we understand, is, that indemnification would be a tacit and implied confession on the _right_ of slavery. Admitting, that Abolitionists themselves think and feel so; the rest of the public do not; Abolitionists, therefore, would neither be weakened in principle, nor injured in fact, by giving up this point, except in the workings of their own imagination. This can be a valid objection only as it vitiates principle before the eyes of the public, and in the view of opponents. That, however, not being the fact, the objection ought to lose its force. But suppose some mischievous wags _should_ say to the Abolitionists: “Well, gentlemen, you have given up a main principle, after all”--as they would be intitled to make declaration of their reason for consenting to indemnification, they would not only be defended on that point, but receive credit for making a concession, that involves no sacrifice of principle, for the public good. Consent to indemnification, either for one reason or for another--and every man may have his own reason--and one of the principal causes of the contest is superseded. But will the Abolitionists, from sheer stubbornness, insist upon a point, which, if carried, will ruin the slave States, and reduce them to beggary, involving in the catastrophe