When Lincoln came to Washington he had no experience in diplomacy or statesmanship; as an attorney, he had dealt only with local and State statutes; as a legislator, his experience was limited to provincial affairs; his only knowledge of the operations of the general government was acquired during the two years he was in Congress and from books that he read. He had never argued a case before the Supreme Court, he had never studied international law, he knew nothing of the organization of armies, and he was unfamiliar with the relations between the Chief Executive and his Cabinet; but we have seen in Chapter V. how promptly, firmly, and conclusively, and at the same time with what tact and diplomacy, he rebuked Seward's suggestion that he should surrender the prerogatives of his office to the Secretary of State, how positive yet how gentle was his treatment of Frémont, and how thorough his knowledge of the laws of nations is disclosed by his correspondence concerning the movement of troops through Maryland and Virginia, regarding the suspension of the writ of _habeas corpus_, the arrest of Vallandigham, and especially in connection with the Emancipation Proclamation. President Lincoln made it a rule never to deny or explain any charge against himself, nor to reply to an attack, except when the fortunes of his country seemed to be involved; and when he did make a reply it was always complete and satisfactory. Almost the very moment that he crossed the threshold of the White House Lincoln was confronted with the gravest diplomatic problem of his experience, and its solution required not only knowledge of precedent but skill in argument. The claim of the Confederacy to be recognized as a nation by the powers of Europe had practically been waived by President Buchanan when he admitted that the Federal government had no authority to keep a State in the Union if it desired to secede. This admission had been confirmed by the apparent acquiescence in the withdrawal of South Carolina and other States; by the organization of the Confederacy at Montgomery without interference or protest; by the failure to reinforce Fort Sumter; and by Buchanan's practical abdication of executive power when, in his message of January 8, 1861, he threw the entire responsibility of the situation upon Congress.