All through these rapid and radical changes the foreign powers received no official explanation or information from the Department of State at Washington, and were left to draw their own inferences from the news which appeared in the public press, until February 28, when Jeremiah S. Black, for a few weeks Secretary of State, issued a circular instructing our representatives at foreign capitals that the government of the United States had not relinquished its constitutional jurisdiction anywhere within its territory and did not intend to do so. In the same circular he gave instructions that a recognition of the Confederacy must not be allowed. Upon assuming the duties of Secretary of State, Mr. Seward hastily confirmed these instructions and expressed the confidence of the President in the speedy suppression of the Rebellion and the restoration of the unity and harmony of the nation. From France and England came non-committal and unsatisfactory replies, and before Mr. Adams, who had been appointed minister to England, could arrive in London, an unfriendly ministry issued a proclamation of neutrality practically recognizing the Confederate States as an independent government and conceding it the privileges of a belligerent power. Thus, before it had a single ship afloat, its fleets were tendered the hospitality of the British ports on terms of equality with the fleets of the United States. France at once imitated this precipitate action, which was prompted by the desire of the British manufacturers to secure free trade and cheap cotton. The Emperor of the French was actuated by confidence that a division of the American Union would aid in the advancement of his plans to erect an empire in Mexico. Exasperated by the injustice of this action, Mr. Seward wrote Mr. Adams a despatch which would have imperilled our relations with Great Britain had it been delivered in its original form. Fortunately, the President had enjoined the Secretary of State not to send anything of importance without first submitting it to him; hence Lincoln was able to modify what Mr. Seward's inflammable temper had suggested and at the same time add to the force and the dignity of the despatch. A comparison of the text of the original with the final copy as sent to the American legation at London demonstrates the superiority of Lincoln's judgment as well as his mastery of the language of diplomacy. It is remarkable that a mind untrained to consider the consequences of international discourtesy and a hand unaccustomed to frame the phrases of diplomacy should have been so apt and so skilful in removing the sting from the indignant paragraphs of an experienced statesman without diminishing their tone, or force, or dignity.