Much pains had been taken to impose the burthens as equally as possible. If the duty on molasses bears hard upon one State, the tonnage duty would bear equally so upon others. But still it is probable, that there are unequal pressures laid by the bill, which experience alone could enable the Legislature to alter to the satisfaction of all parties. The system was great, complex, and comprehensive; it embraces commerce, manufactures, agriculture, finance, and, in short, every thing in which a nation can be concerned. Will it be prudent, then, under our present disadvantages, and without information, to enact a law affecting the highest interests of the people, which can never be repealed but by the consent of three independent bodies? Gentlemen have told us, that no valuable purpose can be answered by making the law temporary; now, he thought a valuable purpose could be answered by it. The two Houses of Congress, with the qualified negative of the President, formed the legislative power of the United States; they are distinct powers to be exercised by both branches of the Legislature. The House had been told, on a former occasion, that the Senate possessed greater powers than the Representatives. He admitted that, in some instances, they had greater powers; but with respect to revenue matters, they certainly had less, and very properly so. Shall we then give up to a body, who has already a superiority over us, those superior powers which we possess relative to revenue? A perpetual system would give the Senate greater advantages than constitutionally they ought to enjoy. He thought it of little consequence for the House to possess the right of originating money bills, if those money bills were made perpetual. The exercise of this right would be lost, and he thought it necessary that every part of Government should feel itself dependent upon the people. We have been told, with truth, that the Senate are a virtuous body; they are so, and he hoped would remain so, for ages yet to come, nay for ever; and, in his legislative capacity, he would act upon no other supposition. But still it ought to be remembered, that they would always be men, and liable to all the errors, frailties, and infirmities, with the rest of their fellow-mortals; besides, they were constituted in some measure for purposes to which the other branch was incompetent; while this House was constituted for purposes for which the Senate is unequal. It is a well-grounded republican maxim, that taxation and representation should depend each on the other. The people should be taxed only by representatives chosen for that purpose. This principle was written in the hearts of our British ancestors; it had been maintained by the best blood of our citizens, and he hoped it would descend with the fullest energy to our posterity. What, said he, are we about to do? A great branch of revenue, indeed the only branch, to which an application is