now proper, or expected by the people, is about to be put out of our hands for ever; for it would not be in the power of this House, or any future House, to annihilate those funds without the consent of the Senate and the concurrence of the President. Now, the Senate are not an equal representation of the people; in that body the States have equal numbers, while, in this House, the representation is proportioned to their population. Delaware sends one, Georgia three, and Virginia ten. Is it possible, in the nature of things, that two Senators can be as well acquainted with the feelings and interest of the people of Virginia, as ten men selected from among them, and taken from the several parts of the State? Will the people be satisfied to have that body able to continue a revenue system which their immediate representatives think oppressive, or perhaps unnecessary? Certainly they would not; whatever the wisdom and virtue of the Senate may be, he was convinced they were not competent to those peculiar objects for which a just representation was absolutely necessary. The Senate, it is true, is not a House of Lords; they do not possess any properties materially distinguishing them from the members of the House of Representatives; but, though the distinction is not so striking in the one case as in the other, yet it was nevertheless real. The House of Lords is created by the King, and is a permanent body; the Senate is chosen by the State Legislatures, and though the individuals have not a permanency in office, yet the body never ceases to exist. These circumstances, in the constitution of the Senate, afforded a powerful objection to the new system of Government, and the people would never have adopted it, had they supposed that the powers of this body were unlimited in continuing a system of taxation, which had at any time met the approbation of their particular representatives.[23]