Here this author lays it down, that there can be no doubt of the power of the Senate in the business of removal. Let this be as it may, I am clear that the President alone has not the power. Examine the constitution; the powers of the several branches of Government are there defined; the President has particular powers assigned him; the Judiciary have in like manner powers assigned them; but you will find no such power as removing from office given to the President. I call upon gentlemen to show me where it is said that the President shall remove from office. I know they cannot do it. Now, I infer from this, that, as the constitution has not given the President the power of removability, it meant that he should not have that power; and this inference is supported by that clause in the constitution which provides that all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and on conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. Here is a particular mode described for removing; and if there is no other mode directed, I contend that the constitution contemplated only this mode. I imagine, sir, we are declaring a power in the President which may hereafter be greatly abused; for we are not always to expect a Chief Magistrate in whom such entire confidence can be placed as in the present. Perhaps gentlemen are so much dazzled with the splendor of the virtues of the present President, as not to be able to see into futurity. The framers of the constitution did not confine their views to the first person who was looked up to to fill the Presidential chair. If they had, they might have omitted those checks and guards with which the powers of the Executive are surrounded. They knew, from the course of human events, that they could not expect to be so highly favored of heaven as to have the blessing of his administration more than seven or fourteen years; after which, they supposed a man might get into power, who, it was possible, might misbehave. We ought to follow their example, and contemplate this power in the hands of an ambitious man, who might apply it to dangerous purposes. If we give this power to the President, he may, from caprice, remove the most worthy men from office. His will and pleasure will be the slight tenure by which an office is to be held, and of consequence you render the officer the mere state-dependant, the abject slave of a person who may be disposed to abuse the confidence his fellow-citizens have placed in him.