Mr. AMES.--When this question was agitated at a former period, I took no part in the debate. I believe it was then proposed, without any idea or intention of drawing on a lengthy discussion, and to me it appeared to be well understood and settled by the House; but since it has been reiterated and contested again, I feel it my bounden duty to deliver the reasons for voting in the manner I then did, and shall now do. Mr. Chairman, I look upon every question which touches the constitution as serious and important, and therefore worthy of the fullest discussion, and the most solemn decision. I believe, on the present occasion, we may come to something near certainty, by attending to the leading principles of the constitution. In order that the good purposes of a Federal Government should be answered, it was necessary to delegate considerable powers; and the principle upon which the grant was made, intended to give sufficient power to do all possible good, but to restrain the rulers from doing mischief. The constitution places all executive power in the hands of the President, and could he personally execute all the laws, there would be no occasion for establishing auxiliaries; but the circumscribed powers of human nature in one man, demand the aid of others. When the objects are widely stretched out, or greatly diversified, meandering through such an extent of territory as that the United States possess, a minister cannot see with his own eyes every transaction, or feel with his hands the minutiæ that pass through his department. He must therefore have assistants. But in order that he may be responsible to his country, he must have a choice in selecting his assistants, a control over them, with power to remove them when he finds the qualifications which induced their appointment cease to exist. There are officers under the constitution who hold their office by a different tenure--your judges are appointed during good behavior; and from the delicacy and peculiar nature of their trust, it is right it should be so, in order that they may be independent and impartial in administering justice between the Government and its citizens. But the removability of the one class, or immovability of the other, is founded on the same principle, the security of the people against the abuse of power. Does any gentleman imagine that an officer is entitled to his office as to an estate? Or does the Legislature establish them for the convenience of an individual? For my part I conceive it intended to carry into effect the purposes for which the constitution was intended.