Amongst the motives to such an institution the assimilation of the principles, opinions, and manners of our countrymen, by the common education of a portion of our youth from every quarter, well deserves attention. The more homogeneous our citizens can be made in these particulars, the greater will be our prospect of permanent union; and a primary object of such a national institution should be the education of our youth in the science of Government. In a Republic, what species of knowledge can be equally important? and what duty more pressing on its Legislature, than to patronize a plan for communicating it to those who are to be the future guardians of the liberties of the country? The institution of a Military Academy is also recommended by cogent reasons. However pacific the general policy of a nation may be, it ought never to be without an adequate stock of military knowledge for emergencies. The first would impair the energy of its character, and both would hazard its safety, or expose it to greater evils when war could not be avoided: besides, that war might often not depend upon its own choice. In proportion as the observance of pacific maxims might exempt a nation from the necessity of practising the rules of the military art, ought to be its care in preserving and transmitting by proper establishments the knowledge of that art. Whatever argument may be drawn from particular examples, superficially viewed, a thorough examination of the subject will evince that the art of war is at once comprehensive and complicated; that it demands much previous study; and that the possession of it, in its most improved and perfect state, is always of great moment to the security of a nation. This, therefore, ought to be a serious care of every Government; and for this purpose an Academy, where a regular course of instruction is given, is an obvious expedient, which different nations have successfully employed. The compensations to the officers of the United States in various instances, and in none more than in respect to the most important stations, appear to call for Legislative revision. The consequences of a defective provision are of serious import to the Government. If private wealth is to supply the defect of public retribution, it will greatly contract the sphere within which the selection of character for office is to be made, and will proportionally diminish the probability of a choice of men, able, as well as upright. Besides, that it would be repugnant to the vital principles of our Government virtually to exclude from public trusts, talents, and virtue, unless accompanied by wealth.