Mr. PAGE said, that he was sorry that his colleague had made this amendment, as he had done it with a view to defeat the original resolution. If humanity alone were to direct his vote upon this question, and if the amendment had been proposed more early and singly, he might have voted for it. But that not being the case, it, as well as motives of general policy, influenced him in favor of the original motion. He had reasons which could not apply to the amendment. He should vote against it. He was bound by order to confine himself to the single question before the committee. This is, Shall the amendment be received or not? He declared it as his opinion that the case of Lexington ought not to be connected with that of Savannah, which had been, as stated by the member from South Carolina, materially different. He was restrained by order from entering into the merits of the original resolution, but he thought that he had a right to hint at the motive of policy which would apply to the resolution, and not to the amendment. This was, that Savannah being an important place, it would be wise and politic to prevent its revival from being owing to any other aid than that of the General Government of the United States. It ought not to be under obligations to individuals, or single States, and much less to a foreign power. Mr. HARTLEY hoped the amendment would not prevail. If the loss of the people at Lexington had been greater than they could support, they would doubtless have applied to the Legislature of Virginia, but he had not heard of any such application having been made. He agreed with the gentleman last up, that the General Government ought to relieve distresses of this kind. Mr. MURRAY inquired when the fire happened at Lexington? Mr. MOORE answered, about nine months ago. He thought it was the duty of the United States first to pay the claims which were made upon them by distressed soldiers and others for past services, who were denied justice because they had passed an act of limitation. If they were to act from generosity, he said that generosity ought to be extended universally. It was a new doctrine that because a sufferer by fire did not live in a commercial city he was not equally entitled to relief with the inhabitants of a city, and that though such persons were called upon to contribute to the losses of others, they could have no redress for their own. This seemed as if favorite spots were to be selected upon which special favor was to be shown. He was opposed to all such humanity.