Of trade, credit was the life; without it, it could not exist. In this country, too, it was the great source of revenue. How impolitic then was it, in a country where the whole of the revenue, and much of the wealth of its citizens, depended upon trade, to adopt regulations which would repress mercantile exertion and enterprise. It was contended, that it was not true that the principle of a bankrupt law operated in favor of the debtor; the reverse was the case, and constituted one of the strongest arguments of its superiority to insolvent laws, under which the time of surrender was left to the option of the debtor; whereas, under a bankrupt law, the creditor, whenever he had reason to apprehend the fraud or failure of his debtor, could take out a commission under the bankrupt law; the creditor may arrest the prodigal or unjust career of the debtor; while, under the insolvent law, the debtor rarely surrenders his property, until he has squandered nearly the whole, or until he has made a fraudulent transfer of it. Such was the operation of the principle of a good bankrupt system; with regard to the present it was admitted that its provisions were unfair, and operated frequently the other way. A leading argument in favor of a bankrupt system was that it multiplied checks against fraud; there would of course be less temptation to commit fraud, as the chances of concealing it diminished. In most countries the terrors of an awful punishment awaited the commission of fraud under this act, even the terrors of death. Though it might not be sound policy in this country to make punishments so terrible, yet it was always within the power of the Legislature to make transgressions so penal, as to guard against the apprehended evils.