Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 3 (of 16)United States. Congress
History
Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 3 (of 16)
United States. Congress
Law -- United States; United States -- Politics and government
He had moved for the insertion of three instead of five, with this
precise and special intention, that the people themselves should have the
power of electing the President and Vice President; and that intrigues
should be thereby for ever frustrated. The intention of the convention
was that the election of the chief officers of the Government should
come as immediately from the people as was practicable, and that the
Legislature should possess the power only in such an exigency as accident
might give birth to, but which they had considered as likely to occur.
Had it not been for these considerations, the large States never would
have given up the advantages which they held in point of numbers. If the
number five were to be continued, and the House of Representatives made
the last resort, he would undertake to say, that four times out of five
the choice would devolve upon them.
Mr. HILLHOUSE.--In avoiding rocks he feared we were steering for
quicksands. The evils that are past we know; those that may arrive
we know not. The object proposed is to provide against a storm, a
phenomenon not rare or unfrequent in republics. You are called upon
to act upon a calculation that all the States in the Union will vote
for the same persons, or that each of two parties opposed in politics
will have an individual candidate. Suppose the two candidates who had
the highest votes on the late election had been the champions of two
opposite parties, and that neither would recede, what then would be the
consequence; according to the gentleman from Maryland, a civil war!
When men are bent on a favorite pursuit, they are too apt to shut out
all consequences which do not bear out their object. Thus gentlemen
can very well discover the danger they have escaped, but they do not
perceive that the opposition of two powerful candidates gives, besides
the hazard of civil war, the hazard of placing one of them on a permanent
throne. The First Magistracy of this nation is an object capable of
exciting ambition; and no doubt it would one day or other be sought
after by dangerous and enterprising men. It was to place a check upon
this ambition that the constitution provided a competitor for the Chief
Magistrate, and declared that both should not be chosen from the same
State. Here also was a guard against State pride, and this guard you wish
to take away; and what will be the consequence? Instead of two or three
or five, you will have as many candidates as there are States in the
Union. By voting for two persons without designation, the States stood a
double chance of a majority, besides the chance of a majority of all the
States in the House of Representatives. For once or twice there may be
such an organization of party as will secure for a conspicuous character
the majority of votes. But that character cannot live always. The evil
of the last election will recur, and be greater, because the whole field
will be to range in.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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