The constitution is nicely balanced, with the federative and popular principles; the Senate are the guardians of the former, and the House of Representatives of the latter; and any attempts to destroy this balance, under whatever specious names or pretences they may be presented, should be watched with a jealous eye. Perhaps a fair definition of the constitutional powers of amending is, that you may upon experiment so modify the constitution in its practice and operation, as to give it, upon its own principles, a more complete effect. But this is an attack upon a fundamental principle established after a long deliberation, and by mutual concession, a principle of essential importance to the instrument itself, and an attempt to wrest from the small States a vested right, and by it, to increase the power and influence of the large States. I shall not pretend, sir, that the parties to this constitutional compact cannot alter its original essential principles, and that such alterations may not be effected under the name of amendment; but, let a proposal of that kind come forward in its own proper and undisguised shape; let it be fairly stated to Congress, to the State Legislatures, to the people at large, that the intention is to change an important federative feature in the constitution, which change in itself and all its consequences, will tend to a consolidation of this Union into a simple republic; let it be fairly stated, that the small States have too much agency in the important article of electing a Chief Magistrate, and that the great States claim the choice; and we shall then have a fair decision. If the Senators of the small States, and if their State Legislatures, will then quietly part with the right they have, no person can reasonably complain. Nothing can be more obvious, than the intention of the plan adopted by our constitution for choosing a President. The Electors are to nominate two persons, of whom they cannot know which will be President; this circumstance not only induces them to select both from the best men; but gives a direct advantage into the hands of the small States even in the electoral choice. For they can always select from the two candidates set up by the Electors of large States, by throwing their votes upon their favorite, and of course giving him a majority; or, if the Electors of the large States should, to prevent this effect, scatter their votes for one candidate, then the Electors of the small States would have it in their power to elect a Vice President. So that, in any event, the small States will have a considerable agency in the election. But if the discriminating or designating principle is carried, as contained in this resolution, the whole, or nearly the whole right and agency of the small States, in the electoral choice of Chief Magistrate, is destroyed, and their chance of obtaining a federative choice by States, if not destroyed, is very much diminished.