Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 3 (of 16)United States. Congress
History
Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 3 (of 16)
United States. Congress
Law -- United States; United States -- Politics and government
The whole power of election is now vested in the two parties; numbers and
States, or, great and small States; and it is demonstration itself, if
you increase the power of the one, in just such proportion you diminish
that of the other. Do the gentlemen suppose that the public will, when
constitutionally expressed by a majority of States, in pursuance of the
federative principle of our Government, is of less validity, or less
binding upon the community at large, than the public will expressed by
a popular majority? The framers of your constitution, the people who
adopted it, meant, that the public will, in the choice of a President,
should be expressed by Electors, if they could agree, and if not, the
public will should be expressed by a majority of the States, acting in
their federative capacity, and that in both cases the expression of the
public will should be equally binding.
It is pretended that the public will can never properly or
constitutionally be expressed by a majority of numbers of the people, or
of the House of Representatives. This may be a pleasing doctrine enough
to great States; but it is certainly incorrect. Our constitution has
given the expression of the public will, in a variety of instances, other
than that of the choice of President, into very different hands from
either House of Representatives or the people at large. The President and
Senate, and in many cases the President alone, can express the public
will, in appointments of high trust and responsibility, and it cannot
be forgotten that the President sometimes expresses the public will by
removals. Treaties, highly important expressions of the public will, are
made by the President and Senate; and they are the supreme law of the
land. In the several States, many great offices are filled, and even
the Chief Magistracy, by various modes of election. The public will is
sometimes expressed by pluralities instead of majorities, sometimes by
both branches of the Legislatures, and sometimes by one, and in certain
contingencies, elections are settled by lot. The people have adopted
constitutions containing such regulations, and experience has proved that
they are well calculated to preserve their liberties and promote their
happiness. From what good or even pardonable motive, then, can it be
urged that the present mode of electing our President has a tendency to
counteract the public will? Do gentlemen intend to destroy every federal
feature in this constitution? And is this resolution a precursor to a
complete consolidation of the Union, and to the establishment of a simple
republic?--Or will it suffice to break down every federative feature
which secures to one portion of the Union, to the small States, their
rights?
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