above) speaks of the _certa dogmata_ of this old school as opposed to the incertitude of the New Academy. _Descriptio_: so Halm here, but often _discriptio_. The _Corp. Inscr._, vol. I. nos. 198 and 200, has thrice _discriptos_ or _discriptum_, the other spelling never. §18. _Ut mihi quidem videtur_: MSS. transpose _quidem_ and _videtur_, as in 44. _Quidem_, however nearly always comes closely after the pronoun, see _M.D.F._ IV. 43, cf. also I. 71, III. 28, _Opusc._ I. 406. _Expetendarum fugiendarumque_: ‛αιρετων και φευκτων, about which more in n. on 36. The Platonic and Aristotelian ethics have indeed an external resemblance, but the ultimate bases of the two are quite different. In rejecting the Idea of the Good, Aristotle did away with what Plato would have considered most valuable in his system. The ideal theory, however, was practically defunct in the time of Antiochus, so that the similarity between the two schools seemed much greater than it was. _Non sus Minervam_: a Greek proverb, cf. Theocr. _Id._ V. 23, _De Or._ II. 233, _Ad Fam._ IX. 18, 3. Binder, in his German translation of the _Academica_, also quotes Plutarch _Præc. Polit._ 7. _Inepte ... docet_: elliptic for _inepte docet, quisquis docet_. _Nostra atque nostros_: few of the editors have understood this. Atticus affects everything Athenian, and speaks as though he were one of them; in Cic.'s letters to him the words "_tui cives_," meaning the Athenians, often occur. _Quid me putas_: i.e. _velle_. _Exhibiturum_: Halm inserts _me_ before this from his one MS. G, evidently emended here by its copyist. For the omission of _me_, cf. note on 7. §§19--23. Part II. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' _Ethics_. Summary. The threefold division of philosophy into ηθικη, φυσικη, διαλεκτικη. Goodness means obedience to nature, happiness the acquisition of natural advantages. These are of three kinds, mental, bodily, and external. The bodily are described (19); then the mental, which fall into two classes, congenital and acquired, virtue being the chief of the acquired (20), then the external, which form with the bodily advantages a kind of exercise-ground for virtue (21). The ethical standard is then succinctly stated, in which virtue has chief part, and is capable in itself of producing happiness, though not the greatest happiness possible, which requires the possession of all three classes of advantages (22). With this ethical standard, it is possible to give an intelligent account of action and duty (23).