Communications were still terrible. For example, Ryan twice reported the southern end of Green Beach to be heavily mined, a message that never reached any higher headquarters. But General Smith on board _Maryland_ did receive direct word of Ryan’s success and was overjoyed. For the first time Smith had the opportunity to land reinforcements on a covered beach with their unit integrity intact. General Smith and “Red Mike” Edson had been conferring that morning with Colonel Maurice G. Holmes, commanding the 6th Marines, as to the best means of getting the fresh combat team ashore. In view of the heavy casualties sustained by Hays’ battalion on Red Beach Two, Smith was reconsidering a landing on the unknown eastern end of the island. The good news from Ryan quickly solved the problem. Smith ordered Holmes to land one battalion by rubber rafts on Green Beach, with a second landing team boated in LCVPs prepared to wade ashore in support. At this time Smith received reports that Japanese troops were escaping from the eastern end of Betio by wading across to Bairiki, the next island. The Marines did not want to fight the same tenacious enemy twice. Smith then ordered Holmes to land one battalion on Bairiki to “seal the back door.” Holmes assigned Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray to land 2/6 on Bairiki, Major “Willie K.” Jones to land 1/6 by rubber boat on Green Beach, and Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth F. McLeod to be prepared to land 3/6 at any assigned spot, probably Green Beach. Smith also ordered the light tanks of Company B, 2d Tank Battalion, to land on Green Beach in support of the 6th Marines. These tactical plans took much longer to execute than envisioned. Jones was ready to debark from _Feland_ (APA 11) when the ship was suddenly ordered underway to avoid a perceived submarine threat. Hours passed before the ship could return close enough to Betio to launch the rubber boats and their LCVP tow craft. The light tanks were among the few critical items not truly combat loaded in their transports, being carried in the very bottom of the cargo holds. Indiscriminate unloading during the first 30 hours of the landing had further scrambled supplies and equipment in intervening decks. It took hours to get the tanks clear and loaded on board lighters. Shoup was bewildered by the long delays. At 1345 he sent Jones a message: “Bring in flamethrowers if possible.... Doing our best.” At 1525 he queried division about the estimated landing time of LT 1/6. He wanted Jones ashore and on the attack before dark.