I have to bring forward to the public eye, and the eye of posterity, too, the character of the Peninsular soldiers, whether they be shown up as men who were able to conquer the choicest legions of France, or as men who would sell the most essential part of their dress for a glass of brandy. No matter; they would have done both. Perfection is nowhere to be found; and if the British soldier equalled the Frenchman in habits of sobriety and caution, there could be no possible comparison between them; but the retreat from Madrid and Burgos, which I am about to relate, will give the reader a clearer insight into what I have just now written: and I will here say, without the least fear of contradiction, that the French soldier as far surpasses the British soldier in the essential qualities requisite for general operations, as the latter excels the Frenchman in a pitched battle. Let two armies of the two nations be placed in circumstances the same, in advance or retreat. The supply of provisions may be scanty or abundant—no matter which; both armies, for argument sake, we will say, are placed in the same position as to food. It may be asked what, then, is the great difference between the soldiers of two nations who have been opposed to each other for so many campaigns, and who ought to have profited by the better system followed by either? It is this: the British soldier is not so moderate in his appetites as his neighbour, and he wants the head, which the other possesses, to control him. Give to a British regiment ten days', nay five days' bread at a time, and, as may be necessary, five days' rations of spirits; at the end of the second day—not the fifth, to which period it ought to last—what quantity will be forthcoming? Not one half ounce of bread, or half pint of spirits—half pint did I say! not one thimbleful, nay, less than that, not one drop! Should the ration be limited to bread, and in all armies, even the most temperate, a large advance of spirits ought to be avoided, the danger would be the same in any British army, because the soldiers would barter their bread for spirits or wine, and would become quite as inefficient, as if they had been supplied with both by our commissaries. Added to this, what means had the soldiers of the Peninsular army to compete with the French in celerity of cooking? None. The latter carried their cooking utensils on their backs, while the camp-kettles for our troops were often leagues distant when the meat arrived. This was the state of our army when the retreat from Burgos on the one side, and Madrid on the other, commenced, and it will be seen in the following pages how that retreat was conducted, and how the subordinate officers of the army were blamed for not performing a duty which was impossible; and for this reason was it impossible, that the means did not rest with them. Our system was altogether faulty, and no exertions of the junior, or even senior, officers could remedy it.