Poetic genius ought to have strength enough to rise with a free and innate activity above all the _accidental_ hinderances which are inseparable from every confined condition, to arrive at a representation of humanity in the absolute plenitude of its powers; it is not, however, permitted, on the other hand, to emancipate itself from the necessary _limits_ implied by the very idea of human nature: for the absolute only in the circle of humanity is its true problem. Simple genius is not exposed to overstep this sphere, but rather _not to fill it entirely_, giving too much scope to external necessity, to accidental wants, at the expense of the inner necessity. The danger for the sentimental genius is, on the other hand, by trying to remove all limits, of nullifying human nature absolutely, and not only rising, as is its right and duty, beyond finite and determinate reality, as far as absolute possibility, or in other terms to idealize; but of passing even beyond possibility, or, in other words, _dreaming_. This fault—overstraining—is precisely dependent on the specific property of the sentimental process, as the opposite defect, _inertia_, depends on the peculiar operation of the simple genius. The simple genius lets nature dominate, without restricting it; and as nature in her particular phenomena is always subject to some want, it follows that the simple sentiment will not be always _exalted_ enough to resist the accidental limitations of the present hour. The sentimental genius, on the contrary, leaves aside the real world, to rise to the ideal and to command its matter with free spontaneity. But while reason, according to law, aspires always to the unconditional, so the sentimental genius will not always remain _calm_ enough to restrain itself uniformly and without interruption within the conditions implied by the idea of human nature, and to which reason must always, even in its freest acts, remain attached. He could only confine himself in these conditions by help of a receptivity proportioned to his free activity; but most commonly the activity predominates over receptivity in the sentimental poet, as much as receptivity over activity in the simple poet. Hence, in the productions of simple genius, if sometimes inspiration is wanting, so also in works of sentimental poetry the _object_ is often missed. Thus, though they proceed in opposite ways, they will both fall into a _vacuum_, for before the æsthetic judgment an object without inspiration, and inspiration without an object, are both negations.