Lately, Habib Ullah has shown signs of awakening to the responsibilities of his position; and it is to be hoped that, under pressure from recent political circumstances, he may abandon the foolish indulgence to which hitherto he has been a slave. Indications of this spirit are not very pronounced, but their manifestation does not come a moment too soon. In the main they are associated with military matters, although certain measures deal exclusively with the administration. Among the former, orders have been given to the leather factories in Kabul to manufacture 300,000 sets of infantry equipment and an agent has been despatched to India to purchase gear for the mounted branches of the service. At best these activities are no promise of an abiding interest in his service and, indeed, they are discounted by his refusal to hearken to advice. At the present time the army of Afghanistan, in its existing condition, admittedly possesses in a high degree the qualities of endurance, courage and mobility; but, in spite of its modern guise, it lacks discipline and cohesion and, as a fighting machine, is liable upon these grounds to be thrown quickly out of gear. Under these circumstances the observation may perhaps be hazarded that it would be as well before equipping it with first-class material to make sure that the men were sufficiently organised to understand its use. At present modern weapons are unknown to the great bulk of the forces of Afghanistan; and it cannot be denied that the absence of this quality makes it more of a menace to itself than to an enemy. Hitherto, there has been greater variety than method in the Afghan military equipment, irregularity of pattern distinguishing alike rifle, field-piece and ammunition, while the education of the officers and the training of the men has been neglected. The continuation of these imperfections is due primarily to the inability of the Amir of Afghanistan to rely upon the loyalty of his troops. At the same time, their existence appertains to every Oriental army which is placed solely in native custody. They have always been a feature of the Afghan service. The condition of the garrison in the capital perhaps reveals some little superiority over those which are placed further afield, but it can be affirmed quite truly that the military qualities of Afghanistan proceed entirely from the inborn fanaticism of its people and not from the practical organisation of its active state. Nevertheless under conditions applicable to mountain warfare the Afghan army could become an invaluable auxiliary; although its capacity, as well as its determination, to offer any prolonged resistance are matters of doubt. Defects could be removed by re-organisation; good qualities enhanced by careful training under British officers or by the despatch of selected Afghan officers and men for training with our own troops.