In spite of the obduracy of Habib Ullah over this point, he has made known his intention of falling back upon the support of the Indian Government when his own arms have been defeated. This contingency, which is liable to arise at the outset of a war with any foreign power, imposes upon the Government of India a thankless burden, in no way lessened by the proposal of the Amir to create in Kabul an Afghan Staff College, and the determination of the Imperial Government to avoid insistence upon what is, by no means, an unreasonable precaution. As matters rest at present unless change is introduced the preposterous conceit, which distinguishes the Afghans, is destined to receive an unwelcome shock. Nevertheless the Amir cannot be persuaded to place his military affairs in the hands of the Indian Government; since, now that the Japanese have beaten the Russians and, in the mind of the Amir, the Imperial Government is frightened at the Russian Government, the Afghans argue, having defeated British arms, that they are now superior to the Japanese. Therefore, they deny us the possession of any point of advantage in their country, a consummation which, while not quite that towards which our diplomacy has been directed, may be ascribed to the results, in combination, of a policy of friendly missions and half measures. Now that we have given Habib Ullah permission to import without check unlimited supplies of arms and ammunition the disadvantages of such a situation increase rather than diminish; as it exists so close to the Indian frontier and in a way in which it cannot be controlled by the Indian Government, it behoves the Imperial Government to come to a definite decision at once with regard to its line of action in relation to Afghanistan. [Illustration: INFANTRY ON THE MARCH]