Again, always pre-supposing the steady loyalty of the great bulk of the European troops, Russia has not enrolled any large number of native recruits in regions beyond the Caspian Sea; although her policy in the Caucasus has not been quite so exclusive. The success of any native insurrectionary movement in Trans-Caspia would depend, therefore, upon the precise amount of support that it received from any disaffected sections of the Caucasian establishment that might be incorporated with the Russo-European army on service in the Khanates. No doubt the wide area covered by the rebellion in the Caucasus will encourage the Caucasian element in the Trans-Caspian army to be troublesome; and, since the Caucasian races in a measure are akin with the Central Asian peoples, mutual sympathy may give rise to positive revolt in Central Asia. Between the European soldiers and the native races, however, there is little in common; and unless revolutionary agents from St. Petersburg, Moscow or the larger centres of disturbance contaminate the adherence of the men, there is really nothing to cause them to listen to any seditious overtures which might emanate from native sources. It is very easy in Central Asia to remove the rails of the permanent way or to interrupt telegraphic communication, since the railway and the wires run for hundreds of miles unguarded and at the mercy of any wandering, discontented miscreant. Such instances of disaffection would be sporadic. Difficulties of combination--if the great distances separating Khiva, Merv, Bokhara and Tashkent were ignored, which they cannot be if the position of affairs is to be appraised properly--would alone prevent any simultaneous co-operation; while whatever unanimity might be disclosed by actively hostile parties of native or European revolutionaries, the forces at the disposal of the military authorities must enable them to suppress the movement rapidly and at once.