foot and frequently also to "Kuchi" camels. These passes (so far as we can learn) could, any of them, be readily made available for mountain artillery with a very small expenditure of constructive labor and engineering skill. In Koh Dahman nearly every village of importance lying at the foot of the eastern slopes of the Paghman (such as Beratse, Farza, Istalif, etc.) covers a practicable pass over the Paghman, which has its continuation across the Shoreband valley and over the ridge of the Hindoo Kush beyond it. But between the Khak Pass and the Irak, the various routes across the Hindoo Kush, whether regarded as routes to India or to Kandahar, although they by no means converge on Kabul City, must necessarily pass within striking distance of an army occupying Kabul. Such a force would have, first of all, thoroughly to secure its communication with the Oxus, and a strong position at Kabul itself. Having the official statement of a military engineer with reference to the Oxus-Hindu-Kush line, as a barrier or base or curtain, we may pass to the principal approach to Herat from the northwest. There are four distinct lines by which Russia could move on Herat: I. From the _Caspian_ base a trans-Caucasian army corps could move (only with the concurrence and alliance of Persia) by the Mashed route direct; II. Or it could move outside Persian territory, from _Chikishliar_ by the Bendessen Pass to Asterabad, and would then have to pass through Persian territory to Sarakhs, or across the desert to Merv; III. From the _Tashkend-Bokhara_ base a route exists _via_ Charjui, the Oxus, direct to Merv; and there is IV. Also the well-known road by _Balkh_ and Mamiana, direct to Herat. Routes III. and IV. having just been discussed, let us look at Routes I. and II.