After the Rain : how the West lost the EastVaknin, Samuel
History
After the Rain : how the West lost the East
Vaknin, Samuel
Europe, Eastern -- Economic conditions -- 1989-; Europe, Eastern -- Politics and government -- 1989-
Second, the IMF must maintain transparency. It controls vast resources.
It is prone to be inefficient (not to say corrupt). Transparency
humbles, ensures the injection of fresh intellectual blood, improves
performance, and gives taxpayers a good feeling. The IMF needs to be
humbled. Its actions have been politicised lately. It intervenes in the
internal affairs of dozens of sovereign, reasonably managed countries -
and its intervention is not confined to matters economic. It develops
an internal "Organizational cult" (we know best and always). It is one
of the most rigid and intellectually handicapped organizations in the
world, yet it considers itself a bastion of economic ingenuity and
righteousness. Delusions of grandeur are dangerous on such a scale.
Third, the revamped, no-longer-haughty, IMF must be able to fine tune
to different social and cultural constraints in different spots of the
world. It must strive at least to BE SEEN to be trying to minimize the
social costs of its often-botched plans. It must not behave as a
colonial power, which it often does. It must establish trust rather
than impose discipline. Otherwise, it stands no chance to laugh last.
Actually, it stands no chance even to survive.
(Article published January 4, 1999 in "The New Presence")
Return
Financial Crisis, Global Capital Flows and the International Financial
Architecture
The recent upheavals in the world financial markets were quelled by the
immediate intervention of both international financial institutions
such as the IMF and of domestic ones in the developed countries, such
as the Federal Reserve in the USA. The danger seems to have passed,
though recent tremors in South Korea, Brazil and Taiwan do not augur
well. We may face yet another crisis of the same or a larger magnitude
momentarily.
What are the lessons that we can derive from the last crisis to avoid
the next?
The first lesson, it would seem, is that short term and long-term
capital flows are two disparate phenomena with very little in common.
The former is speculative and technical in nature and has very little
to do with fundamental realities. The latter is investment oriented and
committed to the increasing of the welfare and wealth of its new
domicile. It is, therefore, wrong to talk about "global capital flows".
There are investments (including even long term portfolio investments
and venture capital) - and there is speculative, "hot" money. While
"hot money" is very useful as a lubricant on the wheels of liquid
capital markets in rich countries - it can be destructive in less
liquid, immature economies or in economies in transition.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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