Home rule -- Ireland; Ireland -- Economic conditions; Land tenure -- Ireland
There are, of course, other reasons why there should be no delegation of
the power to impose Customs and Excise. The constitutional objections to
such a course are overwhelming. It would involve the abandonment of the
plea that Home Rule for Ireland was the prelude to Home Rule all round;
in other words, that separation was the condition precedent to
federalism. In every federal system in the world the control of Customs
and Excise has been retained by the central authority. This is true not
only of the quasi-federations within the British Empire; it is equally
true of the United States, Germany, and Switzerland. One can scarcely be
surprised at the emphatic repudiation which such a proposal received at
the hands of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Mr. J.M.
Robertson) when, on February 7, 1912, in a speech at Lincoln, he said--
"There was, however, just one thing that must remain one for three
kingdoms, and that was the fiscal system, Customs and Excise. _It
was a federal union we want, a federal state._ If they were to do
as some of his unreflecting Home Rule friends, Irish and English,
have done, and demand that Ireland should not only have power to
lay taxes but to fix Customs and Excise then they had no State left
at all."
Another obvious objection to such a course is that it necessitates the
erection of a Customs barrier between Ireland and Great Britain. Tariff
Reformers are ready to admit that the present fiscal system is at least
as injurious to Ireland as to other portions of the United Kingdom. The
power to impose Customs duties on British goods--and the proportion of
British total imports is so large that if this power were limited to
foreign goods it would be financially valueless--would no doubt provide
the Irish Exchequer with considerable funds and might be used to develop
her prosperity. But the separation of the Customs systems for the
purpose of enabling Ireland to impose tariffs in her own interests would
necessarily be followed by a demand for treaty-making powers such as
have been successfully claimed and are now enjoyed by British Dominions
overseas. Under a general tariff for the United Kingdom the same
advantages would accrue to Ireland without any corresponding damage to
British or Imperial interests.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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