In the case of the military machines at the French manœuvres above mentioned, the work of pilot and observer was often divided; and it was found that the observer generally required some familiarity with flight before acquiring the requisite sharpness of vision. Generally speaking, in the manœuvres, the information brought back was clear, defined, decisive. The intelligence brought back by cavalry scouts has sometimes been a puzzle to the generals in command--hints suggesting to them probabilities, perhaps, rather than accumulated certainties. But the air scouts brought such definite statements as these: “Have seen infantry hidden in a wood,” “A squadron with machine guns are marching towards ----,” “Seen a company digging trenches at ----,” “The enemy are in full retreat,” etc. The value of the new arm was manifest in this country in the very first manœuvres in which aëroplanes were used; by its use the plans made were all rapidly discovered and rendered useless! Plans made on the old principle of fighting in the dark, each side ignorant of the operations of the other, fell through once and for all; and it became recognised that the coming of the aëroplane meant the revolution of the methods of conducting war. But if from the experience of manœuvres the value of aëroplane reconnaissance was patent to expert military authority, the public generally did not realise the value of the new arm until it had been tried in something beyond mimic warfare. This occurred in the Italian war operations in Tripoli. In this war the need of reconnaissance was great; operations had to be carried on in a difficult country, and with an enemy that adopted “tricky” forms of warfare. To Italy belongs the credit of being the first nation to put aëroplanes to the test in war, both for reconnaissance and offensive purposes. The types of aëroplanes used in this war were chiefly Blériot and Nieuport monoplanes; one Etrich monoplane was also included. Very valuable information was acquired on several occasions by the air scouts, who flew over wide tracts of desert, marking the position of Turks and Arabs, and ascertaining their movements preparatory to making attacks on Italian positions. The aëroplanes were fired upon by the enemy, and sometimes the wings of an aëroplane were riddled by shot without resulting accident, proving that the riddling of the wings, so long as sufficient supporting surface remains, is not the greatest evil to be feared. On one occasion Lieutenant Rossi, while making a reconnaissance, nearly fell into the hands of the Arabs. The motor suddenly stopped, and his machine was rapidly falling; the motor, however, recovered just in time for the aviator to remain in the air, and he was able to return to Tripoli.