‘What dost thou gaze at now, oh son of Kleinias?’ a strong voice said, as a firm hand was placed upon his shoulder, ‘and what art thou thinking of this bright holiday? Shall not thy paidagogos take thee to the palaistra, or wilt thou rather stay and talk with me a while? It is seldom I can see thee, child, or hear how thy books agree with thee.’ ‘I was thinking, Perikles, of all the men and women there below. Art thou indeed their governor, and canst thou do whate’er thou wilt with them?’ ‘Not I, forsooth, my boy; all citizens are free and equal by the laws of Athens.’ ‘Dost thou not make their laws?’ ‘No; not so, indeed. They make their laws themselves. I do but counsel them, and, as long as they permit, I see the laws are carried out, and those are brought to trial and to punishment who may transgress them.’ ‘But what dost thou mean by laws, Perikles?’ ‘Whatsoever the people, met together in their Assembly, ordain, that we all must do.’ ‘Do! whether good or bad?’ ‘No; good, of course. Dost thou suppose the people would decree that we should do the bad?’ ‘Has every state its own assembly, then?’ ‘No; thou knowest well in Sparta, and in other states, a few great ones make the laws, and not the people. Hast thou not yet learnt that at school?’ ‘Yes; I remember now. But what I want to know is this: supposing a few great ones decree what all must do, wouldst thou call that a law?’ ‘Of course I should, if the oligarchy was in power.’ ‘But, then, suppose a tyrant, such as my mother told me my great ancestor Kleisthenes of Sikyon was, one who took by force the power from the people—if such a one makes a decree, is that a law?’ ‘Yes, in truth it is, since it is made by one who has the power to make it.’ ‘But if a tyrant came and upset our laws, and then by force, and not by trying to persuade the people, decreed that they must obey his will, whether it was good or bad, would that be a law?’ ‘No, child; that would be a breaking of the laws. I ought not to have said the orders of a tyrant were laws, if they were made by force, and not persuasion.’ ‘If, then, some oligarchs should make decrees without consulting anyone, would they be laws?’ ‘Whoever makes decrees, if they be founded upon force, and not persuasion, I call that rather an injustice than a law.’ ‘Then, if the Athenians should impose their will upon the rich without consulting them, would not that be an injustice too, or would it be a law?’ ‘Now, my good Alkibiades, go off and do thy exercises. Boys of your age are always asking questions. Where is Zopyros?’ ‘Oh, Zopyros is a fool! he tells me nothing; and when I wish to talk to the wise men, who know the things I want to learn, he holds me back. Other boys talk to them after their exercises at the palaistra, and why not I?’ ‘There is no reason why thou shouldst not, child.’