Altruism: Its Nature and VarietiesPalmer, George Herbert
Philosophy
Altruism: Its Nature and Varieties
Palmer, George Herbert
Altruism
I have been expounding here something so familiar that it is seldom
mentioned or even thought of, but is usually taken as a matter
of course. Yet surely it is important to perceive how wide is the
extent of altruism. It is nothing occasional, calling for exceptional
heroism. It is commonplace, spread all around us, attending the most
elementary processes of existence. We never approach one another as
separate beings, but are called on wherever we meet to put each other
at ease, whatever may be the cost to ourselves. Well does Bentham
write: “Good breeding is that deportment on occasions of inferior, and,
when separately taken, of trivial importance by which those acts are
abstained from which give annoyance to others. It is to this negative
or abstinential branch of benevolence that most of the laws of good
breeding are to be referred.” Christ in offering the Golden Rule seems
not to be urging unusual conduct, but rather to suggest that we carry
out consistently and as a plan of life a principle inwrought into the
very structure of our being. We are made conjunctive. Any attempt to
exhibit the varieties of altruism must take this beautiful fact as its
starting-point.
No one has set forth more clearly the scope and delicacy of manners
than Adam Smith in those chapters of his _Moral Sentiments_ which
treat of Propriety. He asks what feelings may properly be expressed
in company and what others, equally natural, the well-mannered man
suppresses. The general principle is that those which have their root
in specific circumstances of the individual, as, for example, the
physical experiences, should be kept in the background. A gentleman
does not talk of his toothache or recent cold, nor does he show his
strong appetite at table. While recognizing that all may properly be
interested in his intended marriage, he dwells on the intensity of
his affection only to the lady herself. These are matters relating to
the separate self, while manners give expression only to what all can
share. Our ardent personal passions, even when entirely justified,
often need to be flattened down before they can be fit to express.
Manifestations of the social passions, kindness and pity, are seldom
improper. These give a double opportunity for sympathy. We share the
feelings both of the sufferer and the humane speaker. But the emotions
that terminate in ourselves, like joy and grief, require care. On
the whole, Smith thinks we may count on sympathy with our small joys
and large griefs. Happiness is something delightful to share, at
least until it becomes so great as to awaken envy. And though it is
disagreeable to hear of petty annoyances, which a gentleman passes
lightly by, serious misfortune is so much a part of the common lot that
all will sympathize in hearing of it and be pleased that they have
in this instance escaped. The death of a relative may not improperly
put its mark on our very clothing, but it is indecent to speak of our
vexations from servants and children.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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