Altruism: Its Nature and VarietiesPalmer, George Herbert
Philosophy
Altruism: Its Nature and Varieties
Palmer, George Herbert
Altruism
Pass them briefly in review. When I say a man is kind in Manners, do I
not suggest that there may be a contrast between his outward bearing
and his inner heart? Or shall we call the relation one of Propriety,
as Adam Smith does in his masterly discussion of this moral situation?
Propriety always stirs aversion, because it implies that we have had
little share in establishing the standard employed. It has been set up
outside us and still we are subjected to it. How exasperated a child
is when told to behave properly! Why should he care for Propriety?
Or shall we say Civility? It is a scrimping, meagre word, announcing
that only so much consideration is shown as decency requires. When we
hear a man say, “John was civil to me,” our thought continues: “Was
that all? Did he go no further than that?” How would Politeness do?
More than Manners it hints at insincerity and conduct that hopes to
gain something for itself. Beware of a polite man. He is likely to use
you for his own ends. Might we then talk of Good Breeding? When any
one calls me well-bred he praises my parents, not me. The excellence
on which I pride myself has apparently come from their training. What
shall we say of Courtesy? That it is a term of dignity, but suggests
stooping. The one with whom I deal is accounted my inferior. Or
Gentlemanliness? To call a young fellow a gentleman makes his heart
throb. Yet the word does not escape a certain limitation. It uses
the standard of a particular set, “our crowd.” If my conduct does
not accord with their usages, I am not a gentleman. The word lacks
universality.
By such questionable terms our language names the beautiful relation I
am now to set forth. Since Manners is on the whole the least stained
word among them, the one most nearly neutral, I adopt it, but I shall
read into it much more meaning than people generally intend. To cover
its full meaning I am obliged to frame a statement so burdened with
details that it will hardly be recognized as anything commonly called
Manners. But it shall be explained clause by clause, and I ask my
reader to watch whether I have introduced anything into it which might
be omitted or omitted anything which should have been introduced. The
definition runs thus: By Manners I mean such a voluntary conformity to
a code of conduct as, within a fixed field of intercourse, insures to
each person the least offense and a due opportunity of self-expression.
Four elements are here named as belonging to Manners. I will take them
up separately and in order.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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