The Federalists in Congress seized upon this question as one upon which they could make an aggressive war against Jefferson’s administration, and resolutions were introduced asking information on the subject. Jefferson, however, wisely avoided all entangling suggestions, and sent Monroe to aid Livingston in effecting a purchase. The treaty was formed in April, 1803, and submitted by Jefferson to the Senate in October following. The Republicans rallied in favor of this scheme of annexation, and claimed that it was a constitutional right in the government to acquire territory—a doctrine widely at variance with their previous position, but occasions are rare where parties quarrel with their administrations on pivotal measures. There was also some latitude here for endorsement, as the direct question of territorial acquisition had not before been presented, but only hypothetically stated in the constitutional disputations then in great fashion. Jefferson would not go so far as to say that the constitution warranted the acquisition to foreign territory, but the scheme was nevertheless his, and he stood in with his friends in the political battle which followed. The Federalists claimed that we had no power to acquire territory, and that the acquirement of Louisiana would give the South a preponderance which would “continue for all time (poor prophets they!), since southern would be more rapid than northern development;” that states created west of the Mississippi would injure the commerce of New England, and they even went so far as to say that the “admission of the Western World into the Union would compel the Eastern States to establish an eastern empire.” Doubts were also raised as to the right of Louisianians, when admitted to citizenship under our laws, as their lineage, language and religion were different from our own. Its inhabitants were French and descendants of French, with some Spanish creoles, Americans, English and Germans—in all about 90,000, including 40,000 slaves. There were many Indians of course, in a territory then exceeding a million of square miles—a territory which, in the language of First Consul Napoleon, “strengthens forever the power of the United States, and which will give to England a maritime rival that will sooner or later humble her pride”—a military view of the change fully justified by subsequent history. Napoleon sold because of needed preparations for war with England, and while he had previously expressed a willingness to take fifty million francs for it, he got sixty through the shrewd diplomacy of his ministers, who hid for the time their fear of the capture of the port of New Orleans by the English navy.