nor can they act upon their own opinion or knowledge._" These views were concurred in by all the Judges. _Denio_, J., who wrote a dissenting opinion in the case, concurred with the other Judges as to the powers and duties of inspectors. The defendants, then, have not in the least violated any law of the State of New York. They performed their duty according to the statute and in accordance with the decision of the highest court of the State, and in accordance with the printed instructions furnished them by the Secretary of State. What further can be demanded of them? No United States statute prescribes or attempts to prescribe their duties. They cannot legally be convicted and should be discharged. 3. Because no malice is shown. Whether the women were entitled to have their names registered and to vote, or not, the defendants believed they had such right, and acted in good faith, according to their best judgment, in allowing the registry of their names--and in receiving their votes--and whether they decided right or wrong in point of law, they are not guilty of any criminal offense. The substance of the statute is, as to registration: "If any such officer shall ... _knowingly and wilfully_ register as a voter any person not entitled to be registered, or refuse to so register any person entitled to be registered ... every such person shall be deemed guilty of a crime." Act of May 31, 1870, Sec. 20, As Amended by Act of Feb. 28, 1871, Sec. 1. And as to voting: "If any person shall ... _knowingly and wilfully_ receive the vote of any person not entitled to vote, or refuse to receive the vote of any person entitled to vote ... every such person shall be deemed guilty of a crime." Act of May 31, 1870, Sec. 19. To bring an inspector within either of these sections he must know as _matter of fact_, that the person offering to vote, or to be registered, is not entitled to be registered or to vote. The inspectors were _compelled to decide the question_, and to decide it instantly, with no chance for examination or even consultation--and if they decided in good faith, according to the best of their ability, they are excused, whether they decided correctly or not in point of law. This is too well settled to admit of dispute--settled by authority as well as by the plainest principles of justice and common sense. The law never yet placed a public officer in a position where he would be compelled to decide a doubtful legal question, and to act upon his decision, _subject to the penalty of fine_ or imprisonment if he chanced to err in his decision. All that is ever required of an officer, so placed, whether a judicial or ministerial officer, _so far as is necessary to escape any imputations of crime_, is good faith. Ministerial officers may be required, in some cases to act at their peril as to _civil_ responsibilities, but as to _criminal responsibilities_ never.