Inspectors of elections, however, _acting in good faith_, incur neither civil nor criminal responsibilities. In _Jenkins vs. Waldron (11 John 114)_, which was an action on the case against inspectors of election for refusing to receive the vote of the plaintiff, a duly qualified voter, it was held, that the action would not lie _without proving malice_. Spencer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court, closes as follows: "It would in our opinion be opposed to all the principles of law, justice and sound policy, to hold that officers called upon to exercise their deliberate judgments, _are answerable for a mistake in law_, either civilly or criminally, where their motives are pure and untainted with fraud or malice." The same point precisely was decided in a like case, in the Supreme Court of this State recently and _Jenkins vs. Waldron approved_. Goetchens vs. Mathewson, 5 Lansing, 214. In Harman v. Tappenden and fifteen others (1 East 555) the plaintiff was a freeman of the company of free fishermen and dredgermen of the manor and hundred of Faversham in Kent, and the defendants, as officers of the company, caused him "wrongfully, unlawfully and unjustly" to be disfranchised, and removed from his said office of freeman. He was restored by mandamus, and brought his action on the case against the defendants who removed him, to recover his damages. On the trial before Lord Kenyon, C.J., a verdict was taken for the plaintiff for nominal damages, with leave to the defendant to move to enter a non-suit. On that motion Lord Kenyon, C.J., said: "Have you any precedent to show that an action of this sort will lie, without proof of malice in the defendants, or that the act of disfranchisement was done on purpose to deprive the plaintiff of the particular advantage which resulted to him from his corporate character? I believe this is a case of the first impression, where an action of this kind had been brought, _upon a mere mistake, or error in judgment_. The plaintiff had broken a by-law, for which he had incurred certain penalties, and happening to be personally present in the court, he was called upon to show cause why he should not pay the forfeitures; to which not making any answer, but refusing to pay them, the court proceeded, taking the offense _pro confesso_, without any proof, to call on him to show cause why he should not be disfranchised; and they accordingly made the order. This was undoubtedly irregular, but it was nothing more than a mistake, and there was no ground to impute any malicious motives to the persons making the order."