Moreover, it is claimed that it is proper to call them _principles of common sense_, because they are that kind of sense which is _common_ to the whole race, and also they are _often_ referred to, both by metaphysicians and by the common people, by this term. In the following chapters it will be shown that by the application of these principles, a system of natural religion can be gained from the works of the Creator by the same methods that men employ in all the ordinary concerns of life, and that thus we are as fully qualified to gain religious knowledge and peace as we are to secure temporal comfort and prosperity. CHAPTER X. COMMON SENSE APPLIED TO GAIN THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. Having explained what is intended by the principles of common sense, the next attempt will be to apply certain of these principles to gain a system of _natural religion_; meaning by this term that religion which may be gained from the _works_ of the Creator independently of any revealed Word. In all systems of religion the first article relates to the existence and character of the Deity to be worshiped and obeyed. The first principle of common sense to guide us in this inquiry is this: Every change has a producing cause. In the widest sense of the word, _cause_ signifies something as an antecedent, without which a given change will not occur, and with which it will occur. This is the leading idea in every use of this word. Then there are two classes of causes; the first are _necessary_ or _producing causes_, and the second _occasional causes_. A _producing cause_ is an antecedent which _produces_ a given change. _Occasional causes_ are those circumstances which are indispensable to the action of producing causes. Thus, fire applied to powder is the producing cause of an explosion, while the placing of the two together is the occasional cause of it. The idea of a producing cause is one which probably is gained when we first discover that our own will moves our own limbs and other things around us. When we will to move a thing, and find the intended change follows our volition to move it, then we can not help believing that our own mind _produced_ this change. At the same time we gain the idea of _power_ to produce this change, and the belief also that the thing changed had _no power_ to refrain from the change. Our only mode of defining the idea of a _producing cause_, of _power_ and of _want of power_, is to refer to occasions when, by willing, we cause changes, and thus become conscious of the existence and nature of these ideas by experience. So also we have no mode of defining our _sensations_ but by stating the occasions in which we are conscious of them. For instance, _whiteness_ is the sensation we have when we look at snow, and _blackness_ is the sensation we have when we look at charcoal.