1. The orator is the good man skilled in speaking. ‘The good man’ means nature, character, accomplishments (_artibus_). ‘Skilled in speaking’ means studied eloquence, which consists of five parts: invention, ordering, diction and style, memory, delivery, and the purpose, which is to persuade of something. 2. Skill in speaking consists in three things: nature, learning, practise; nature, that is, talent; learning, knowledge; practice, continuous labor. These are the things that are looked to not only in the orator but in every artist with a view to accomplishment. Chapter 4. The three kinds of causes. 1. There are three kinds of causes: deliberative, epideictic, judicial. The deliberative kind is that in which there is a discussion as to what ought or ought not to be done in regard to any of the practical affairs of life. The epideictic, in which a character is shown to be praiseworthy or reprehensible. 2. The judicial, in which opinion as to reward or punishment with reference to an act of an individual is given. Chapter 16. Style and diction. 2. One must use good Latin and speak to the point. He speaks good Latin who constantly uses the true and natural names of things, and is not at variance with the style and literary refinement of the present time. Let it not be enough for him to be careful of what he says, without saying it in a clear, attractive manner; nor that only, without saying what he says wittily also. Chapter 21. On figures. 1. Speech is amplified and adorned by the use of figures. Since direct, unvaried speech creates a weariness and disgust both of speaking and hearing, it must be varied and turned into other forms, so that it may give renewed power to the speaker, and become more ornate and turn the judge from an aloof countenance and attention. ON DIALECTIC INTRODUCTION In tracing the fortunes of logic through the period of decadence and the dark ages the effect upon it of a transition from a pagan to a Christian environment need scarcely be taken into consideration. Such marks of degeneration as it shows must be attributed simply to the general decay of thought, which was marked in both pagan and Christian spheres. By its character logic was well adapted to pass from the service of Greek philosophy and science to that of Christian theology: it had been worked out mainly as a method of Greek science, which was especially backward in the fields where induction plays a large part; consequently the Greek logic is not inductive. It is the logic of universals ready-made, and it has nothing to do with their making; it receives universals as authoritative. It was therefore most welcome to Christian thinkers, since it was precisely adapted to “the task of drawing out the implications of dogmatic premises.”[224] [224] H. W. Blunt, Art. “Logic,” in _Encycl. Brit._, 11th ed. See also Rashdall, _Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages_ (Oxford, 1895), vol. i, p. 36.