An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
or that a protuberant angle in the cube, that pressed his hand
unequally, shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube.”—I agree
with this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his
answer to this problem; and am of opinion that the blind man, at first
sight, would not be able with certainty to say which was the globe,
which the cube, whilst he only saw them; though he could unerringly
name them by his touch, and certainly distinguish them by the
difference of their figures felt. This I have set down, and leave with
my reader, as an occasion for him to consider how much he may be
beholden to experience, improvement, and acquired notions, where he
thinks he had not the least use of, or help from them. And the rather,
because this observing gentleman further adds, that “having, upon the
occasion of my book, proposed this to divers very ingenious men, he
hardly ever met with one that at first gave the answer to it which he
thinks true, till by hearing his reasons they were convinced.”
9. This judgement apt to be mistaken for direct perception.
But this is not, I think, usual in any of our ideas, but those received
by sight. Because sight, the most comprehensive of all our senses,
conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours, which are
peculiar only to that sense; and also the far different ideas of space,
figure, and motion, the several varieties whereof change the
appearances of its proper object, viz. light and colours; we bring
ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other. This, in many cases
by a settled habit,—in things whereof we have frequent experience is
performed so constantly and so quick, that we take that for the
perception of our sensation which is an idea formed by our judgment; so
that one, viz. that of sensation, serves only to excite the other, and
is scarce taken notice of itself;—as a man who reads or hears with
attention and understanding, takes little notice of the characters or
sounds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by them.
10. How, by Habit, ideas of Sensation are unconsciously changed into
ideas of Judgment.
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