An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
The knowing precisely what our words stand for, would, I imagine, in
this as well as a great many other cases, quickly end the dispute. For
I am apt to think that men, when they come to examine them, find their
simple ideas all generally to agree, though in discourse with one
another they perhaps confound one another with different names. I
imagine that men who abstract their thoughts, and do well examine the
ideas of their own minds, cannot much differ in thinking; however they
may perplex themselves with words, according to the way of speaking of
the several schools or sects they have been bred up in: though amongst
unthinking men, who examine not scrupulously and carefully their own
ideas, and strip them not from the marks men use for them, but confound
them with words, there must be endless dispute, wrangling, and jargon;
especially if they be learned, bookish men, devoted to some sect, and
accustomed to the language of it, and have learned to talk after
others. But if it should happen that any two thinking men should really
have different ideas, I do not see how they could discourse or argue
one with another. Here I must not be mistaken, to think that every
floating imagination in men’s brains is presently of that sort of ideas
I speak of. It is not easy for the mind to put off those confused
notions and prejudices it has imbibed from custom, inadvertency, and
common conversation. It requires pains and assiduity to examine its
ideas, till it resolves them into those clear and distinct simple ones,
out of which they are compounded; and to see which, amongst its simple
ones, have or have not a NECESSARY connexion and dependence one upon
another. Till a man doth this in the primary and original notions of
things, he builds upon floating and uncertain principles, and will
often find himself at a loss.
CHAPTER XIV.
IDEA OF DURATION AND ITS SIMPLE MODES.
1. Duration is fleeting Extension.
There is another sort of distance, or length, the idea whereof we get
not from the permanent parts of space, but from the fleeting and
perpetually perishing parts of succession. This we call DURATION; the
simple modes whereof are any different lengths of it whereof we have
distinct ideas, as HOURS, DAYS, YEARS, &c., TIME and ETERNITY.
2. Its Idea from Reflection on the Train of our Ideas.
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