An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
All that is in a man’s power in this case, I think, is only to mind and
observe what the ideas are that take their turns in his understanding;
or else to direct the sort, and call in such as he hath a desire or use
of: but hinder the constant succession of fresh ones, I think he
cannot, though he may commonly choose whether he will heedfully observe
and consider them.
16. Ideas, however made, include no sense of motion.
Whether these several ideas in a man’s mind be made by certain motions,
I will not here dispute; but this I am sure, that they include no idea
of motion in their appearance; and if a man had not the idea of motion
otherwise, I think he would have none at all, which is enough to my
present purpose; and sufficiently shows that the notice we take of the
ideas of our own minds, appearing there one after another, is that
which gives us the idea of succession and duration, without which we
should have no such ideas at all. It is not then MOTION, but the
constant train of IDEAS in our minds whilst we are waking, that
furnishes us with the idea of duration; whereof motion no otherwise
gives us any perception than as it causes in our minds a constant
succession of ideas, as I have before showed: and we have as clear an
idea of succession and duration, by the train of other ideas succeeding
one another in our minds, without the idea of any motion, as by the
train of ideas caused by the uninterrupted sensible change of distance
between two bodies, which we have from motion; and therefore we should
as well have the idea of duration were there no sense of motion at all.
17. Time is Duration set out by Measures.
Having thus got the idea of duration, the next thing natural for the
mind to do, is to get some measure of this common duration, whereby it
might judge of its different lengths, and consider the distinct order
wherein several things exist; without which a great part of our
knowledge would be confused, and a great part of history be rendered
very useless. This consideration of duration, as set out by certain
periods and marked by certain measures or epochs, is that, I think,
which most properly we call TIME.
18. A good Measure of Time must divide its whole Duration into equal
Periods.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account