An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
In the measuring of extension, there is nothing more required but the
application of the standard or measure we make use of to the thing of
whose extension we would be informed. But in the measuring of duration
this cannot be done, because no two different parts of succession can
be put together to measure one another. And nothing being a measure of
duration but duration, as nothing is of extension but extension, we
cannot keep by us any standing, unvarying measure of duration, which
consists in a constant fleeting succession, as we can of certain
lengths of extension, as inches, feet, yards, &c., marked out in
permanent parcels of matter. Nothing then could serve well for a
convenient measure of time, but what has divided the whole length of
its duration into apparently equal portions, by constantly repeated
periods. What portions of duration are not distinguished, or considered
as distinguished and measured, by such periods, come not so properly
under the notion of time; as appears by such phrases as these, viz.
‘Before all time,’ and ‘When time shall be no more.’
19. The Revolutions of the Sun and Moon, the properest Measures of Time
for mankind.
The diurnal and annual revolutions of the sun, as having been, from the
beginning of nature, constant, regular, and universally observable by
all mankind, and supposed equal to one another, have been with reason
made use of for the measure of duration. But the distinction of days
and years having depended on the motion of the sun, it has brought this
mistake with it, that it has been thought that motion and duration were
the measure one of another. For men, in the measuring of the length of
time, having been accustomed to the ideas of minutes, hours, days,
months, years, &c., which they found themselves upon any mention of
time or duration presently to think on, all which portions of time were
measured out by the motion of those heavenly bodies, they were apt to
confound time and motion; or at least to think that they had a
necessary connexion one with another. Whereas any constant periodical
appearance, or alteration of ideas, in seemingly equidistant spaces of
duration, if constant and universally observable, would have as well
distinguished the intervals of time, as those that have been made use
of. For, supposing the sun, which some have taken to be a fire, had
been lighted up at the same distance of time that it now every day
comes about to the same meridian, and then gone out again about twelve
hours after, and that in the space of an annual revolution it had
sensibly increased in brightness and heat, and so decreased
again,—would not such regular appearances serve to measure out the
distances of duration to all that could observe it, as well without as
with motion? For if the appearances were constant, universally
observable, in equidistant periods, they would serve mankind for
measure of time as well were the motion away.
20. But not by their Motion, but periodical Appearances.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account