An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
all, or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain
knowledge of it.
3. Method.
It is therefore worth while to search out the bounds between opinion
and knowledge; and examine by what measures, in things whereof we have
no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our assent and moderate our
persuasion. In order whereunto I shall pursue this following method:—
First, I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or
whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is
conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the
understanding comes to be furnished with them.
Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what knowledge the understanding
hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.
Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of FAITH
or OPINION: whereby I mean that assent which we give to any proposition
as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge. And here we
shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of ASSENT.
4. Useful to know the Extent of our Comprehension.
If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover
the powers thereof; how far they reach; to what things they are in any
degree proportionate; and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of
use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in
meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at
the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance
of those things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the
reach of our capacities. We should not then perhaps be so forward, out
of an affectation of an universal knowledge, to raise questions, and
perplex ourselves and others with disputes about things to which our
understandings are not suited; and of which we cannot frame in our
minds any clear or distinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps
too often happened) we have not any notions at all. If we can find out
how far the understanding can extend its view; how far it has faculties
to attain certainty; and in what cases it can only judge and guess, we
may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this
state.
5. Our Capacity suited to our State and Concerns.
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