An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
and in the year of our Lord 1671, or the 1000th year of the Julian
period. All which distances we measure by preconceived ideas of certain
lengths of space and duration,—as inches, feet, miles, and degrees, and
in the other, minutes, days, and years, &c.
9. All the Parts of Extension are Extension, and all the Parts of
Duration are Duration.
There is one thing more wherein space and duration have a great
conformity, and that is, though they are justly reckoned amongst our
SIMPLE IDEAS, yet none of the distinct ideas we have of either is
without all manner of composition: it is the very nature of both of
them to consist of parts: but their parts being all of the same kind,
and without the mixture of any other idea, hinder them not from having
a place amongst simple ideas. Could the mind, as in number, come to so
small a part of extension or duration as excluded divisibility, THAT
would be, as it were, the indivisible unit or idea; by repetition of
which, it would make its more enlarged ideas of extension and duration.
But, since the mind is not able to frame an idea of ANY space without
parts, instead thereof it makes use of the common measures, which, by
familiar use in each country, have imprinted themselves on the memory
(as inches and feet; or cubits and parasangs; and so seconds, minutes,
hours, days, and years in duration);—the mind makes use, I say, of such
ideas as these, as simple ones: and these are the component parts of
larger ideas, which the mind upon occasion makes by the addition of
such known lengths which it is acquainted with. On the other side, the
ordinary smallest measure we have of either is looked on as an unit in
number, when the mind by division would reduce them into less
fractions. Though on both sides, both in addition and division, either
of space or duration, when the idea under consideration becomes very
big or very small, its precise bulk becomes very obscure and confused;
and it is the NUMBER of its repeated additions or divisions that alone
remains clear and distinct; as will easily appear to any one who will
let his thoughts loose in the vast expansion of space, or divisibility
of matter. Every part of duration is duration too; and every part of
extension is extension, both of them capable of addition or division in
infinitum. But THE LEAST PORTIONS OF EITHER OF THEM, WHEREOF WE HAVE
CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEAS, may perhaps be fittest to be considered by
us, as the simple ideas of that kind out of which our complex modes of
space, extension, and duration are made up, and into which they can
again be distinctly resolved. Such a small part in duration may be
called a MOMENT, and is the time of one idea in our minds, in the train
of their ordinary succession there. The other, wanting a proper name, I
know not whether I may be allowed to call a SENSIBLE POINT, meaning
thereby the least particle of matter or space we can discern, which is
ordinarily about a minute, and to the sharpest eyes seldom less than
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