An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
These two last, ENVY and ANGER, not being caused by pain and pleasure
simply in themselves, but having in them some mixed considerations of
ourselves and others, are not therefore to be found in all men, because
those other parts, of valuing their merits, or intending revenge, is
wanting in them. But all the rest, terminating purely in pain and
pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all men. For we love, desire,
rejoice, and hope, only in respect of pleasure; we hate, fear, and
grieve, only in respect of pain ultimately. In fine, all these passions
are moved by things, only as they appear to be the causes of pleasure
and pain, or to have pleasure or pain some way or other annexed to
them. Thus we extend our hatred usually to the subject (at least, if a
sensible or voluntary agent) which has produced pain in us; because the
fear it leaves is a constant pain: but we do not so constantly love
what has done us good; because pleasure operates not so strongly on us
as pain, and because we are not so ready to have hope it will do so
again. But this by the by.
15. Pleasure and Pain, what.
By pleasure and pain, delight and uneasiness, I must all along be
understood (as I have above intimated) to mean not only bodily pain and
pleasure, but whatsoever delight or uneasiness is felt by us, whether
arising from any grateful or unacceptable sensation or reflection.
16. Removal or lessening of either.
It is further to be considered, that, in reference to the passions, the
removal or lessening of a pain is considered, and operates, as a
pleasure: and the loss or diminishing of a pleasure, as a pain.
17. Shame.
The passions too have most of them, in most persons, operations on the
body, and cause various changes in it; which not being always sensible,
do not make a necessary part of the idea of each passion. For SHAME,
which is an uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of having done
something which is indecent, or will lessen the valued esteem which
others have for us, has not always blushing accompanying it.
18. These Instances to show how our Ideas of the Passions are got from
Sensation and Reflection.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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