An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
I would not be mistaken here, as if I meant this as a Discourse of the
Passions; they are many more than those I have here named: and those I
have taken notice of would each of them require a much larger and more
accurate discourse. I have only mentioned these here, as so many
instances of modes of pleasure and pain resulting in our minds from
various considerations of good and evil. I might perhaps have instanced
in other modes of pleasure and pain, more simple than these; as the
pain of hunger and thirst, and the pleasure of eating and drinking to
remove them: the pain of teeth set on edge; the pleasure of music; pain
from captious uninstructive wrangling, and the pleasure of rational
conversation with a friend, or of well-directed study in the search and
discovery of truth. But the passions being of much more concernment to
us, I rather made choice to instance in them, and show how the ideas we
have of them are derived from sensation or reflection.
CHAPTER XXI.
OF POWER.
1. This Idea how got.
The mind being every day informed, by the senses, of the alteration of
those simple ideas it observes in things without; and taking notice how
one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and another begins to exist
which was not before; reflecting also on what passes within itself, and
observing a constant change of its ideas, sometimes by the impression
of outward objects on the senses, and sometimes by the determination of
its own choice; and concluding from what it has so constantly observed
to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the
same things, by like agents, and by the like ways,—considers in one
thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed, and in
another the possibility of making that change; and so comes by that
idea which we call POWER. Thus we say, Fire has a power to melt gold,
i. e. to destroy the consistency of its insensible parts, and
consequently its hardness, and make it fluid; and gold has a power to
be melted; that the sun has a power to blanch wax, and wax a power to
be blanched by the sun, whereby the yellowness is destroyed, and
whiteness made to exist in its room. In which, and the like cases, the
power we consider is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas.
For we cannot observe any alteration to be made in, or operation upon
anything, but by the observable change of its sensible ideas; nor
conceive any alteration to be made, but by conceiving a change of some
of its ideas.
2. Power, active and passive.
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