An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 — John Shaqi
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
the understanding” have any propriety, they signify to be understood.
So that to be in the understanding, and not to be understood; to be in
the mind and never to be perceived, is all one as to say anything is
and is not in the mind or understanding. If therefore these two
propositions, “Whatsoever is, is,” and “It is impossible for the same
thing to be and not to be,” are by nature imprinted, children cannot be
ignorant of them: infants, and all that have souls, must necessarily
have them in their understandings, know the truth of them, and assent
to it.
6. That men know them when they come to the Use of Reason answered.
To avoid this, it is usually answered, that all men know and assent to
them, WHEN THEY COME TO THE USE OF REASON; and this is enough to prove
them innate. I answer:
7. Doubtful expressions, that have scarce any signification, go for
clear reasons to those who, being prepossessed, take not the pains to
examine even what they themselves say. For, to apply this answer with
any tolerable sense to our present purpose, it must signify one of
these two things: either that as soon as men come to the use of reason
these supposed native inscriptions come to be known and observed by
them; or else, that the use and exercise of men’s reason, assists them
in the discovery of these principles, and certainly makes them known to
them.
8. If Reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate.
If they mean, that by the use of reason men may discover these
principles, and that this is sufficient to prove them innate; their way
of arguing will stand thus, viz. that whatever truths reason can
certainly discover to us, and make us firmly assent to, those are all
naturally imprinted on the mind; since that universal assent, which is
made the mark of them, amounts to no more but this,—that by the use of
reason we are capable to come to a certain knowledge of and assent to
them; and, by this means, there will be no difference between the
maxims of the mathematicians, and theorems they deduce from them: all
must be equally allowed innate; they being all discoveries made by the
use of reason, and truths that a rational creature may certainly come
to know, if he apply his thoughts rightly that way.
9. It is false that Reason discovers them.
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