An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
God, is
only active; pure matter is only passive; those beings that are both
active and passive, we may judge to partake of both. But be that as it
will, I think, we have as many and as clear ideas belonging to spirit
as we have belonging to body, the substance of each being equally
unknown to us; and the idea of thinking in spirit, as clear as of
extension in body; and the communication of motion by thought, which we
attribute to spirit, is as evident as that by impulse, which we ascribe
to body. Constant experience makes us sensible of both these, though
our narrow understandings can comprehend neither. For, when the mind
would look beyond those original ideas we have from sensation or
reflection, and penetrate into their causes, and manner of production,
we find still it discovers nothing but its own short-sightedness.
29. Summary.
To conclude. Sensation convinces us that there are solid extended
substances; and reflection, that there are thinking ones: experience
assures us of the existence of such beings, and that the one hath a
power to move body by impulse, the other by thought; this we cannot
doubt of. Experience, I say, every moment furnishes us with the clear
ideas both of the one and the other. But beyond these ideas, as
received from their proper sources, our faculties will not reach. If we
would inquire further into their nature, causes, and manner, we
perceive not the nature of extension clearer than we do of thinking. If
we would explain them any further, one is as easy as the other; and
there is no more difficulty to conceive how A SUBSTANCE WE KNOW NOT
should, by thought, set body into motion, than how A SUBSTANCE WE KNOW
NOT should, by impulse, set body into motion. So that we are no more
able to discover wherein the ideas belonging to body consist, than
those belonging to spirit. From whence it seems probable to me, that
the simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection are the
boundaries of our thoughts; beyond which the mind, whatever efforts it
would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any
discoveries, when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of
those ideas.
30. Our idea of Spirit and our idea of Body compared.
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