An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
This further is to be observed, that there is no idea we attribute to
God, bating infinity, which is not also a part of our complex idea of
other spirits. Because, being capable of no other simple ideas,
belonging to anything but body, but those which by reflection we
receive from the operation of our own minds, we can attribute to
spirits no other but what we receive from thence: and all the
difference we can put between them, in our contemplation of spirits, is
only in the several extents and degrees of their knowledge, power,
duration, happiness, &c. For that in our ideas, as well of spirits as
of other things, we are restrained to THOSE WE RECEIVE FROM SENSATION
AND REFLECTION, is evident from hence,—That, in our ideas of spirits,
how much soever advanced in perfection beyond those of bodies, even to
that of infinite, we cannot yet have any idea of the manner wherein
they discover their thoughts one to another: though we must necessarily
conclude that separate spirits, which are beings that have perfecter
knowledge and greater happiness than we, must needs have also a
perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have, who are
fain to make use of corporeal signs, and particular sounds; which are
therefore of most general use, as being the best and quickest we are
capable of. But of immediate communication having no experiment in
ourselves, and consequently no notion of it at all, we have no idea how
spirits, which use not words, can with quickness; or much less how
spirits that have no bodies can be masters of their own thoughts, and
communicate or conceal them at pleasure, though we cannot but
necessarily suppose they have such a power.
37. Recapitulation.
And thus we have seen what kind of ideas we have of SUBSTANCES OF ALL
KINDS, wherein they consist, and how we came by them. From whence, I
think, it is very evident,
First, That all our ideas of the several SORTS of substances are
nothing but collections of simple ideas: with a supposition of
SOMETHING to which they belong, and in which they subsist; though of
this supposed something we have no clear distinct idea at all.
Secondly, That all the simple ideas, that thus united in one common
SUBSTRATUM, make up our complex ideas of several SORTS of substances,
are no other but such as we have received from sensation or reflection.
So that even in those which we think we are most intimately acquainted
with, and that come nearest the comprehension of our most enlarged
conceptions, we cannot go beyond those simple ideas. And even in those
which seem most remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely
surpass anything we can perceive in ourselves by reflection; or
discover by sensation in other things, we can attain to nothing but
those simple ideas, which we originally received from sensation or
reflection; as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels, and
particularly of God himself.
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