An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
If I find that I know some few things, and some of them, or all,
perhaps imperfectly, I can frame an idea of knowing twice as many;
which I can double again, as often as I can add to number; and thus
enlarge my idea of knowledge, by extending its comprehension to all
things existing, or possible. The same also I can do of knowing them
more perfectly; i.e. all their qualities, powers, causes, consequences,
and relations, &c., till all be perfectly known that is in them, or can
any way relate to them: and thus frame the idea of infinite or
boundless knowledge. The same may also be done of power, till we come
to that we call infinite; and also of the duration of existence,
without beginning or end, and so frame the idea of an eternal being.
The degrees or extent wherein we ascribe existence, power, wisdom, and
all other perfections (which we can have any ideas of) to that
sovereign Being, which we call G-d, being all boundless and infinite,
we frame the best idea of him our minds are capable of: all which is
done, I say, by enlarging those simple ideas we have taken from the
operations of our own minds, by reflection; or by our senses, from
exterior things, to that vastness to which infinity can extend them.
35. God in his own essence incognisable.
For it is infinity, which, joined to our ideas of existence, power,
knowledge, &c., makes that complex idea, whereby we represent to
ourselves, the best we can, the Supreme Being. For, though in his own
essence (which certainly we do not know, not knowing the real essence
of a pebble, or a fly, or of our own selves) God be simple and
uncompounded; yet I think I may say we have no other idea of him, but a
complex one of existence, knowledge, power, happiness, &c., infinite
and eternal: which are all distinct ideas, and some of them, being
relative, are again compounded of others: all which being, as has been
shown, originally got from sensation and reflection, go to make up the
idea or notion we have of God.
36. No Ideas in our complex ideas of Spirits, but those got from
Sensation or Reflection.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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