An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
Time and place are also the foundations of very large relations; and
all finite beings at least are concerned in them. But having already
shown in another place how we get those ideas, it may suffice here to
intimate, that most of the denominations of things received from TIME
are only relations. Thus, when any one says that Queen Elizabeth lived
sixty-nine, and reigned forty-five years, these words import only the
relation of that duration to some other, and mean no more but this,
That the duration of her existence was equal to sixty-nine, and the
duration of her government to forty-five annual revolutions of the sun;
and so are all words, answering, HOW LONG? Again, William the Conqueror
invaded England about the year 1066; which means this, That, taking the
duration from our Saviour’s time till now for one entire great length
of time, it shows at what distance this invasion was from the two
extremes; and so do all words of time answering to the question, WHEN,
which show only the distance of any point of time from the period of a
longer duration, from which we measure, and to which we thereby
consider it as related.
4. Some ideas of Time supposed positive and found to be relative.
There are yet, besides those, other words of time, that ordinarily are
thought to stand for positive ideas, which yet will, when considered,
be found to be relative; such as are, young, old, &c., which include
and intimate the relation anything has to a certain length of duration,
whereof we have the idea in our minds. Thus, having settled in our
thoughts the idea of the ordinary duration of a man to be seventy
years, when we say a man is YOUNG, we mean that his age is yet but a
small part of that which usually men attain to; and when we denominate
him OLD, we mean that his duration is run out almost to the end of that
which men do not usually exceed. And so it is but comparing the
particular age or duration of this or that man, to the idea of that
duration which we have in our minds, as ordinarily belonging to that
sort of animals: which is plain in the application of these names to
other things; for a man is called young at twenty years, and very young
at seven years old: but yet a horse we call old at twenty, and a dog at
seven years, because in each of these we compare their age to different
ideas of duration, which are settled in our minds as belonging to these
several sorts of animals, in the ordinary course of nature. But the sun
and stars, though they have outlasted several generations of men, we
call not old, because we do not know what period God hath set to that
sort of beings. This term belonging properly to those things which we
can observe in the ordinary course of things, by a natural decay, to
come to an end in a certain period of time; and so have in our minds,
as it were, a standard to which we can compare the several parts of
their duration; and, by the relation they bear thereunto, call them
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