An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 2: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 3 and 4 — John Shaqi
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 2: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 3 and 4Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 2: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 3 and 4
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
Besides persons, countries also, cities, rivers, mountains, and other
the like distinctions of place have usually found peculiar names, and
that for the same reason; they being such as men have often as occasion
to mark particularly, and, as it were, set before others in their
discourses with them. And I doubt not but, if we had reason to mention
particular horses as often as as have reason to mention particular men,
we should have proper names for the one, as familiar as for the other,
and Bucephalus would be a word as much in use as Alexander. And
therefore we see that, amongst jockeys, horses have their proper names
to be known and distinguished by, as commonly as their servants:
because, amongst them, there is often occasion to mention this or that
particular horse when he is out of sight.
6. How general Words are made.
The next thing to be considered is,--How general words come to be made.
For, since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by
general terms; or where find we those general natures they are supposed
to stand for? Words become general by being made the signs of
general ideas: and ideas become general, by separating from them the
circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may determine
them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction
they are made capable of representing more individuals than one; each of
which having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call
it) of that sort.
7. Shown by the way we enlarge our complex ideas from infancy.
But, to deduce this a little more distinctly, it will not perhaps be
amiss to trace our notions and names from their beginning, and observe
by what degrees we proceed, and by what steps we enlarge our ideas from
our first infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the ideas of
the persons children converse with (to instance in them alone) are, like
the persons themselves, only particular. The ideas of the nurse and the
mother are well framed in their minds; and, like pictures of them there,
represent only those individuals. The names they first gave to them are
confined to these individuals; and the names of NURSE and MAMMA, the
child uses, determine themselves to those persons. Afterwards, when time
and a larger acquaintance have made them observe that there are a great
many other things in the world, that in some common agreements of shape,
and several other qualities, resemble their father and mother, and those
persons they have been used to, they frame an idea, which they find
those many particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with
others, the name MAN, for example. And thus they come to have a general
name, and a general idea. Wherein they make nothing new; but only leave
out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that
which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.
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