An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of AssentNewman, John Henry
Religion
An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent
Newman, John Henry
Faith; Theism
This being the state of the case, the question arises, whether,
granting that the personality (so to speak) of the parties reasoning
is an important element in proving propositions in concrete matter,
any account can be given of the ratiocinative method in such proofs,
over and above that analysis into syllogism which is possible in each
of its steps in detail. I think there can; though I fear, lest to some
minds it may appear far-fetched or fanciful; however, I will hazard
this imputation. I consider, then, that the principle of concrete
reasoning is parallel to the method of proof which is the foundation of
modern mathematical science, as contained in the celebrated lemma with
which Newton opens his “Principia.” We know that a regular polygon,
inscribed in a circle, its sides being continually diminished, tends
to become that circle, as its limit; but it vanishes before it has
coincided with the circle, so that its tendency to be the circle,
though ever nearer fulfilment, never in fact gets beyond a tendency. In
like manner, the conclusion in a real or concrete question is foreseen
and predicted rather than actually attained; foreseen in the number
and direction of accumulated premisses, which all converge to it, and
approach it, as the result of their combination, more nearly than any
assignable difference, yet do not touch it logically, (though only not
touching it,) on account of the nature of its subject-matter, and the
delicate and implicit character of at least part of the reasonings on
which it depends. It is by the strength, variety, or multiplicity of
premisses, which are only probable, not by invincible syllogisms,—by
objections overcome, by adverse theories neutralized, by difficulties
gradually clearing up, by exceptions proving the rule, by unlooked-for
correlations found with received truths, by suspense and delay in the
process issuing in triumphant reactions,—by all these ways, and many
others, the practised and experienced mind is able to make a sure
divination that a conclusion is inevitable, of which his lines of
reasoning do not actually put him in possession. This is what is meant
by a proposition being “as good as proved,” a conclusion as undeniable
“as if it were proved,” and by the reasons for it “amounting to a
proof,” for a proof is the limit of converging probabilities.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account